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Both vertical (between job levels) and horizontal (within job levels) mobility can be sources of 
wage growth. We find that the glass ceiling operates at both margins. The unexplained part 
of the wage gap grows across job levels (glass ceiling at the vertical margin) and across the 
deciles of the intra-job-level wage distribution (glass ceiling at the horizontal margin). This 
implies that women face many glass ceilings, one for each job level above the second, and 
that the glass ceiling is a pervasive phenomenon. In the Netherlands it affects about 88% of 
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1. Introduction 
Recent analyses of US case studies – summarized in Shatnawi et al. (2011) – show that women’s 
wages suffer from the effects of hierarchical segregation already at low job levels. This seems to 
suggest that hierarchical segregation is a rather pervasive phenomenon. This evidence is hard to 
reconcile with the literature on the glass ceiling, however, which has stressed that women’s careers 
suddenly slow down (or stop) when approaching management positions. This literature has focused 
on the small fraction of women in the right-hand-side tail of the wage distribution (Muñoz-Bullon, 
2010).
2  
In this paper we argue that these two facts coexist if the analysis is carried out at the job 
level. This is a relevant level of analysis, because both vertical and horizontal (or lateral) careers 
have equally important effects on wages, at least in the Dutch labor market (Dohmen et al., 2004). 
Vertical mobility entails movements between job levels, whereas horizontal mobility entails wage 
growth within the job level.
3 The effects of the glass ceiling on horizontal careers have not been 
investigated to date. 
Studies that use a widening of the gender wage gap’s unexplained part in the upper 
percentiles of the wage distribution (for example Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalan et al., 2007) 
have detected the glass ceiling at the highest job level. However, the quantiles of the wage 
distribution do not map one-to-one to job levels because there is a substantial overlap of wage 
distributions between adjacent job levels. Consequently, these studies have failed to detect a glass 
ceiling below the highest job levels.  
This paper demonstrates that when the analysis is performed at the job level the glass ceiling 
becomes a pervasive phenomenon: most women work in job levels that are characterized by a glass 
ceiling. More specifically, the paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it shows that 
gender differences in job-level attainment account for a substantial portion of the unexplained 
gender wage gap.
4 Second, it shows that the glass ceiling is not necessarily limited to women’s 
entrance into managerial positions. Women face multiple glass ceilings – in principle one at each 
                                                 
2 The glass ceiling appears to be quite a common feature of many European labor markets (Albrecht et al., 2003; Kee, 
2006; Arulampalan et al., 2007; de la Rica et al., 2008). 
3 Horizontal careers are made possible by the substantial intra-job-level wage variation that can be considered as an 
intra-job-level wage distribution. 
4 The importance of gender difference in job-level attainment stems from the consideration that the glass ceiling  could 
be an impediment to women’s career in general (Baxter and Wright, 2000; Wright and Baxter, 2000). Its presence 
would affect women’s wages at lower job levels as well (Britton and Williams, 2000). In fact, women reach lower job 
grades than comparable male colleagues in Sweden, thus implying slower careers and a lower incidence of promotions 
(Kwon et al., 2010). Also Dutch women are less likely to be found in jobs offering career prospects; nevertheless, 
conditional on being in such an occupation, Dutch men and women have equal promotion probabilities (Groot and 
Maarsen van den Brink, 1996). Empirical analyses of gender difference in promotion rates show that US women have 
lower promotion probability than men (McCue, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 1999; Cobb-Clark, 2001). However, studies 
using UK data have found that the probability of promotion does not differ across gender (Booth et al., 2003).   2
job level – because the glass ceiling stops their progression towards the highest deciles of the intra-
job-level wage distribution. In this incarnation, the glass ceiling becomes a pervasive characteristic 
of the Dutch labor market, in which the majority of jobs and women are found in job levels 
characterized by a job-level-specific glass ceiling. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 analyzes gender 
differences in wages across the overall wage distribution. Section 4 focuses on the vertical margin 
of the glass ceiling in the Dutch labor market using the Brown–Moon–Zoloth generalization of the 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition (Brown et al., 1980). Section 5 investigates the pervasiveness of the 
glass ceiling effect on horizontal career moves by applying the quantile decomposition technique to 
the intra-job-level wage distribution (the intra-job-level glass ceiling). Section 6 complements this 
analysis by investigating the incidence of women in the low and high wage segments of the (men’s) 
wage distribution and their wage in expectation. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data 
We use an employer-employee matched data set that was compiled from administrative records of a 
broad sample of firms from all economic sectors. The data were constructed by the Dutch ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment (Venema and Faas, 1999). The data set has two unique features. 
First, it contains a description of the job level, which is linked to both the degree of autonomy in 
decision-making and the complexity of the tasks. The full content of the job description (and of the 
occupational classification) can be found in Appendix I (while additional information on the data 
can be found in (Hassink and Russo, 2010). We use this information to organize jobs into a 
hierarchy consisting of 7 levels (for confidentiality reasons, it has not been possible to use the part 
of the data relative to job levels VII and VIII: top management, board of directors and CEOs). 
These definitions apply to all firms, so that inter-firm hierarchical job levels can be interpreted as 
comparable. 
The second feature of the dataset is that it contains detailed and precise administrative 
information on wages (descriptive statistics are displayed in Appendix 2). The recorded wages 
consist of two parts: the so-called “base wage”, which is linked to job title and occupation (this is 
the wage definition used in standard wage scales), and a variable (individual) wage component, 
which includes overtime payments, compensating differentials (for unpleasant working conditions), 
performance-related pay, and any other form of individual (incentive) pay.
5  
                                                 
5 The dataset also contains information on workers’ characteristics (age, tenure with current employer, gender, non-
Dutch nationality, educational level attained, and normal working hours), occupation and firm characteristics (number 
of employees and economic sector).   3
We will use the base wage of the individual worker. This is the wage component that is least 
sensitive to (unobserved) personal characteristics, since it excludes individual performance-related 
pay components. Hence the gender wage gap that we describe should be regarded as a conservative 
estimate of the real gender wage gap. Throughout the analysis, our dependent variable is the log of 
the hourly base wage (the base wage divided by the contractual number of working hours).  
The dataset consists of 77,707 workers, of whom 52,402 men and 25,305 women (67.5% 
and 32.5%, respectively).  Full-time jobs (at least 36 hours a week) account for the bulk of the 
positions (75%). 75% (18%) of part-time (full-time) jobs are held by women.  Because of the 
important role of marginal jobs for Dutch women, we have distinguished between small part-time 
jobs – fewer than 20 hours – accounting for about 10.5% of all jobs, and regular part-time jobs – 
fewer than 36 hours but more than 20 hours – accounting for the remaining 14.5% of all jobs. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of jobs, men, and women across the hierarchical job ladder. 
The fifth column shows that about 70% of all jobs are concentrated in just three rungs of the job 
ladder (job levels 3, 4, and 5). Moreover, the sixth column shows that the incidence of women 
decreases with the job level.
6 
For each of the job levels, we have determined the wage distribution. Remarkably, there is a 
substantial overlap in wage distribution between adjacent hierarchical job levels (see columns 4 and 
10 of Table 1). The first decile of the wage distribution at a specific level k, (k=1,…,7), is always 
below the ninth decile of the wage distribution of the level directly below (level k-1). To quantify 
the degree of overlap, the fourth column in Table 1 shows the percentage of workers at job level k 
whose wage is below the ninth decile of the wage distribution at job level k-1.
7 The degree of 
overlap does not differ substantially among full-time workers. This brings us to the important 
conclusion that information on the overall wage distribution per se is not sufficient to investigate 
gender segmentation at the level of the job. 
                                                 
6 The pattern is clearly visible when part-time jobs are included (left panel of Table 1), but it is less dramatic when full-
time jobs only are considered (right panel). In fact, the women employed in the first three layers of the job ladder make 
up  44% of total employment of women compared to only 26% of men. Comparison between the number of jobs in the 
right and left panels shows that the lower rungs of the job ladder account for a disproportionally high number of part-
time jobs but only for one quarter of full-time jobs. Therefore, in the empirical application, we will always check our 
estimates based on the full sample (including part-time workers) against those based on the restricted sample of full-
time workers. 
7 As much as three-quarters of the workers at the second job level earn less than the wage corresponding to the ninth 
decile of the wage distribution of job level 1. The degree of overlap between adjacent job levels is equally high in the 
first four job levels and then decreases. However, as much as 38% of workers in the seventh job level earn less than the 
ninth decile of the wage distribution at job level six. Note that 54% (23%) of workers at job level 3 (4) earn less than the 
ninth decile in the wage distribution of job level 1.   4
 
3. Gender wage differentials across the overall wage distribution 
Table 2 shows that the overall wage distribution exhibits a glass ceiling pattern: the raw gender 
wage gap is generally increasing (or roughly constant in the case of full-time workers) across much 
of the support of the wage distribution (the 25th centile is the only exception here) but then 
increases as we move into the upper tail of the wage distribution. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
A standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (not shown) suggests that a large part of the raw 
gender wage gap (which is about 20 log points) can be explained by observable characteristics: the 
unexplained part amounts to 3 log points.
8 However, there is substantial variation in the size of the 
wage gap across the wage distribution. 
Figure 1 shows the raw wage gap and its unexplained part as resulting from a quantile 
regression decomposition using a counterfactual distribution (Machado and Mata, 2005) and 
adopting the equivalent estimator developed in (Melly, 2006). These present a pattern well known 
for the Dutch labor market: a stable raw gender wage gap of 15 log points spanning most  of the 
wage distribution and that tends to grow larger at higher centiles (from the 70
th on).
9 The 
unexplained part of the wage gap is positive (favours women) in the low-wage part of the wage 
distribution but then becomes negative, and it too tends to grow larger across centiles.
10 This pattern 
is interpreted as indicating a glass ceiling which affects the upper tail of the wage distribution. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
This result seems to limit women’s disadvantage to the upper centiles of the job distribution. 
However, in the next section we will show that the impact of gender differences on job level 
attainment is too large to be compatible with this view. In the subsequent sections we will go on to 
show that the glass ceiling affects women’s horizontal careers at most job levels. 
 
4. Wage decomposition at the job level  
                                                 
8 All regressions in the paper use the set of controls described in the note to the tables. Descriptive statistics can be 
found in Appendix 1.  
9 These values of the gender wage gap are similar to those obtained by Albrecht et al. (2009) with a different Dutch data 
set. 
10  The advantage of women at low centiles is probably related to the gender wage gap among part-time workers. Part-
time work has a small negative impact on women’s wages but a large impact on men’s wages, so that the gender wage 
gap among part-time workers tends to be positive (women earn more than men). The positive unexplained part of the 
wage gap is replaced by a small negative gap when the wages of full-time workers only are analyzed.   5
We consider the generalization of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (detailed in Appendix 3). To 
assess the importance of gender differences in job level attainment (which relies on intra-job-level 
wage differentials) we will use the Brown–Moon–Zoloth wage decomposition. This makes it 
possible to ascribe gender differences in wages to, first, gender differences in job-level attainment, 
and second, intra-job-level gender wage differentials.
11  
  The results from the Brown–Moon–Zoloth decomposition are presented in Table 3. The 
unexplained components relative to career progression and intra-job-level wages account for 47 
percent of the raw gender gap. Unexplained gender differences in job-level attainment (vertical 
segregation) contribute to the overall gender wage gap as much as do intra-job-level wage 
differences. In fact, the unexplained components relative to job-level attainment and intra-job-level 
wage gap are of similar size. This remains true in the sub-sample of full-time workers (the two 
“unexplained” components are again equally important, and they now account for 56 percent of the 
raw gender gap).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Analysis of the explained parts of the gender wage gap also offers interesting insights. The 
importance of the explained wage component relative to job-level attainment is largest when part-
time workers, who have reduced career opportunities (given that the vast majority of part-time jobs 
are concentrated in the lowest three job levels), are included in the wage regression. However, its 
relative weight is reduced in the sub sample of full-time workers, in which the explained component 
relative to the intra-job-level wage is about twice as important as the explained component relative 
to job-level attainment.
12  
Gender differences in job-level attainment appear to make an important contribution to the 
gender wage gap. However, the importance of gender differences in careers would still be 
underestimated if glass ceiling-like phenomena hampered the progress of women in horizontal 
careers. Hence, in the following section, we concentrate on this issue. 
 
5. Gender wage gap at the job level  
                                                 
11 We cannot rely on the standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition because it is based on the strong assumption that 
discriminatory practices do not impinge on gender differences in job level attainment.   
12 Another way to see this is to look at counterfactual wages. If women had men’s rewards for their characteristics 
(within job levels) and men’s career opportunities (men’s coefficients in the job level attainment model), the wage 
improvement would account for 25 percent of the raw gender gap. The same computation on the subsample of full-time 
workers returns a wage increase representing 76 percent of the raw gender gap.  Hence, in the full sample, endowments 
can explain about 75 percent of the wage gap, while the amount drops to 26 percent in the full-time workers subsample.   6
In this section we consider the development of the gender wage gap at each job level in order to 
gain insight into the intra-job-level wage distribution.  
The raw gender wage gap at each job level, not yet corrected for workers’ observable 
characteristics, is shown in Table 4. The wage gap across the deciles of the intra-job level wage 
distributions displays an intricate pattern: there is no clear relationship between the size of the 
gender wage gap and the centiles in job levels above the second for the entire data set.
13  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
To detect the presence of a glass ceiling in horizontal careers, we have investigated the 
gender wage across the deciles of the intra-job-level wage distribution by replicating the quantile  
decomposition (Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2006) described in section 3 (shown in Figure 1). 
The raw gender wage gap and its unexplained part at the deciles of the intra-job level wage 
distribution are shown in Table 5. The intra-job-level raw gender wage gap (upper panel in Table 5) 
tends to be roughly constant at higher job levels (above the fourth level) while it is increasing in the 
first two job levels (the third and the fourth job levels appear to be exceptions: in the former case 
there is no apparent pattern, and in the latter case the raw wage gap decreases across deciles). 
The unexplained part of the intra-job-level gender wage gap (lower panel in Table 5) tends 
to increase across job levels: women are penalized at all job levels, but the intensity of the 
penalization increases with the job levels. However, in the first and second job levels women enjoy 
a positive wage gap across most of the deciles. The unexplained part of the wage gap is also 
positive, thus suggesting that men are penalized in the low-wage region of the wage distribution of 
the first job level. However, the unexplained wage gap corresponding to the top decile is negative. 
Hence, even at the job levels where women benefit from positive discrimination, they tend to be 
penalized in the highest part of the wage distribution.
14 
At the third job level, women tend to be penalized from the fourth decile onwards. At higher 
job levels, the unexplained gender wage gap widens across the deciles of the intra-job-level wage 
distribution. We interpret this result – and this is the novel aspect of this paper – as signalling the 
presence of multiple glass ceilings, one for each job level. Women begin to suffer from the “glass 
ceiling” phenomenon early on in their careers, in that they are confronted with the first glass ceiling 
already at the first job level (in particular women in full-time jobs). 
                                                 
13 If the analysis is restricted to full-time workers, the size of the raw gender wage gap appears to decrease across the 
job level specific wage distribution at job levels 4, 5 and 7. 
14 The positive unexplained part turns negative when the analysis is restricted to full-time workers only.  Hence, it is 
mainly part-time men that are penalized vis-à-vis their female counterparts. 
   7
The implication of this finding is that it is not enough to focus on gender differences in job 
level attainment (vertical mobility), for this element alone would underestimate the importance of 
careers towards the gender wage gap. Unexplained forces tend to hamper women’s career in terms 
of wage growth at both the vertical (between job levels) and horizontal (within job level) margins, 
and this latter effect is common. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
6. Women’s position in the men’s wage distribution 
6. 1 The representation index 
The increase in the unexplained part of the gender wage gap across the deciles of the within-job-
level age distribution may not appear to be particularly large. Therefore, it is useful to further 
characterize the relative position of men and women in the within-job-level wage distribution. In 
particular, we will focus on the incidence of women in low- and high-paying jobs. To this end, we 
will make use of the representation and severity indexes applied in the context of racial wage gaps 
(Pendakur et al., 2008).  
The unconditional representation index returns the proportion of women who earn a wage lower 
than the wage relative to a given quantile in the wage distribution of men (the anchoring 
distribution). The conditional representation index adjusts the concentration on women for the 
effects of observable characteristics (by means of a regression). We will focus on only two key 
deciles: the lowest and the highest. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 6. 
Women are clearly over-represented in the lowest part of the overall wage distribution. In 
fact, whilst 10% of men earn a wage smaller than the 1st decile in their wage distribution, 21% of 
women earn less than this amount. In other words, women are over-represented by a factor of 2 in 
this region. By contrast, women are under-represented in the region above the 9th decile. The 
conditional representation index corrects the raw index for observable characteristics. The 
representation of women in the lowest deciles improves dramatically. That is, a large part of the 
over-representation of women in the lowest tail of the wage distribution can be largely attributed to 
their observable characteristics: less experience and human capital, and more part-time jobs. 
However, there remain a substantial over-representation and under-representation of women in the 
lowest deciles and upper deciles of the wage distribution. This pattern shows up also when we 
restrict the attention to full-time workers only.  
We now focus on the various job levels in order to uncover specific patterns. The 
unconditional representation index shows that the first job level is the one that stands apart: it is   8
men that tend to be over-represented in the low-wage region and it is women that are over-
represented above the upper part of the wage distribution (above the 9th decile). This pattern 
persists, although to a lesser extent, also after correcting for observable characteristics. As we move 
to higher job levels, the incidence of women in the upper part of the wage distribution tends to 
decrease, while women tend to be over-represented in the lowest decile. Hence, overall, from the 
third job level onwards (second job level onwards in the case of full-time workers), women tend to 
be over-represented (under-represented) in low (high) wage regions of the intra-job-level wage 
distribution. The under-representation of women in the right tail of the intra-job level of the wage 
distribution is consistent with the presence of a job-level-specific glass ceiling. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
6.2 The severity index 
We next investigate within-decile differences in the ranking of wages by gender. To do so, we use 
the severity index (Pendakur et al., 2008). This index weights women in a given region of the wage 
distribution with a measure of the distance of their wages from the cut-off: that is, it is a weighted 
representation index, where the weights are the wage differentials from the cut-off. Put otherwise, if 
women were concentrated in the low-wage region but their wages were clustered right under the 
first decile, their condition would be a less worrisome than in the case where their wages were 
clustered far away from it. In other words, the severity index measures the incidence of women 
below (or above) a given expectile (Newey and Powell, 1987) in the male wage distribution, where 
an ‘expectile’ is defined as the expectation in the tail (or in a given portion) of the wage 
distribution.
15 
The unconditional and conditional severity indexes are presented in Table 7, which shows that 
observable characteristics, predictably, tend to reduce the extent of the severity. Also in this case, 
consistently with the presence of a job-level-specific glass ceiling, the conditional severity index 
shows that women tend to be under-represented in the highest expectile from the third job level 
(second job level in case of full-time workers) onwards. 
Moreover, by comparing the conditional representation and conditional severity indexes?, 
one can assess whether women tend to cluster close to or far away from the cut-off. Analysis of the 
overall wage distribution shows that there is not much clustering since the values of the severity 
                                                 
15 Quantile regression lines are difficult to compare with OLS regression because the former are obtained through 
minimization of absolute deviations, while the latter is obtained through minimization of squared deviation (Breckling 
and Chambers, 1988). Expectiles instead adopt an asymmetric quadratic loss function and can be regarded as a 
generalization of quantile regression: expectiles are to OLS what quantiles are to the median (Abdous and Remillard, 
1995).   9
index (in Table 7) are very close to that of the representation index (Table 6). However, analysis by 
job level reveals interesting patterns. At the first job level, the higher value of the conditional 
severity index relative to the representation index signals that women in the first decile (of the first 
job level) tend to be clustered towards the low end of the tail of the wage distribution, far from the 
cut-off. The clustering of women does not seem to take place for full-time women; in fact, the 
conditional severity index relative to the first decile is practically identical to the representation 
index.  
The pattern that characterizes women in the top decile is also interesting. Women tend to be 
over-represented at the top decile of the first job level. However, the fact that the conditional 
severity index is smaller than the relative conditional representation index implies that women tend 
to be somewhat clustered in the neighbourhood of the cut-off and are less likely to be found deep in 
the right tail (where relatively high earnings are found).  
In addition, as the job level increases, so the representation of women in the first decile 
appears to increase, and the conditional severity index suggests that, within this decile, women tend 
to be clustered in relatively low wage regions (away from the cut-off). 
At all job levels above the second one, women are under-represented in the top decile of the wage 
distribution. The conditional severity index becomes noticeably smaller than the conditional 
representation index from the fifth job level onwards. This suggests that, for each of the job levels 
of level three and higher, we can observe a level-specific glass ceiling.
16 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
7. Conclusion 
Consistently with the literature stressing the importance of both vertical and horizontal mobility for 
wage growth, we have found that the glass ceiling works at two margins: at the vertical margin, the 
glass ceiling implies that the unexplained part of the wage gap grows across job levels; at the 
horizontal margin, the (intra-job-level) glass ceiling implies that the unexplained part of the gender 
wage gap grows across the deciles of the intra-job-level wage distribution. The paper makes two 
main contributions to the literature. 
The first contribution is the finding that the vertical (inter-job-level) dimension, modelled as gender 
differences in job level attainment, is substantial. We have found that unexplained differences in 
job-level attainment are just as important as unexplained differences in intra-job-level wages. These 
                                                 
16 However, the situation is worse for full-time women: in fact, besides the under-representation in the upper decile, the 
conditional severity index is smaller than the corresponding conditional representation index from the third job level 
onwards.   10
two unexplained components account for 47 percent of the gender wage gap (56 percent among 
full-time workers). Moreover, if women had men’s rewards for observable characteristics and 
men’s career opportunities, their wage would increase by an amount equal to 25 percent of the wage 
gap. The increase would be substantially higher among full-time workers, accounting for 74 percent 
of the gap. 
The second contribution is the finding that gender differences at the horizontal margin are 
pervasive: the glass ceiling is a job-level-specific phenomenon. We have found compelling 
evidence that the glass ceiling is a phenomenon that affects most working women, and not just 
women in managerial positions. In fact, the unexplained part of the gender wage gap widens at 
higher deciles of the intra-job-level wage distribution already at the first job level. However, we do 
not argue that the glass ceiling operates already at the first level because neither the representation 
nor the severity index confirms its presence at the first two job levels; however, they do point to the 
presence of a job-level-specific glass ceiling from the third job level onwards (the second job level 
onwards when the analysis is restricted to full-time workers). In fact, after the third job level the 
conditional representation (severity) index at the 9
th decile (expectile) shows a lower incidence of 
women in this segment of the intra-job level wage distribution.   
Hence, when the horizontal margin is duly considered, the glass ceiling becomes a very 
general feature of the Dutch economy: women tend to face multiple glass ceilings already at the 
third job level (although there are indications that the first glass ceiling may operate already at the 
first or second job level). When calculated in this way, the glass ceiling appears to be a pervasive 
phenomenon affecting most working women: 88% of jobs and 81% of women in the Dutch 
economy are found at job levels characterized by a glass ceiling. Taken together, gender differences 
in mobility at the vertical and horizontal margins account for more than half of the unexplained 
gender wage gap, although the contribution of the gender differences at the horizontal margin is 
rather difficult to quantify. 
   11
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Level      Description (Skill Content or Job Complexity) 
 
Level I:  Very simple and repeated tasks, which do not require any particular education 
or experience, and are carried out under direct supervision. 
Level II:  Simple and repeated tasks, which require some basic administrative or 
technical knowledge or some working experience. Some autonomy is 
required, but the tasks are carried out under supervision. 
Level III:  Less simple tasks, of a repetitive nature, which require low administrative or 
technical knowledge or some working experience. The tasks involve a degree 
of autonomy. 
Level IV:  Less simple tasks, of different kinds, which require low administrative or 
technical knowledge with completed vocational education in a given 
occupation or profession. The tasks involve a degree of autonomy. 
Level V:  Difficult tasks, of many different kinds, which require an intermediate level 
of administrative or technical knowledge and a high level of autonomy. 
Level VI:  Composite tasks within an occupation, which require a high level of 
administrative or technical knowledge and a high level of autonomy. 
Level VII:  Directive and managerial tasks, which require analytical, creative and 
personal communication skills. Tasks are carried out on the basis of 
autonomous decision-making and require an academic education. 
Management (CEO) of mid-size firms and participation in strategic decision-
making. 
Level VIII:  CEO of large firms (not included in the analysis for confidentiality reasons). 
 
Job Type and Occupational Classification 
 
Job Type      CBS one-digit and two-digits Occupational codes 
 
Production    6,  7 
Administrative  3 
Information Technology  083 and 084 
Commercial    4 
Services    5 
Creative      0 (excluded 083 and 084) 
Managerial    2 
 
Appendix 2: Variable List and Descriptive Statistics 
 
TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE   14
Appendix 3.  Statistical method: The Brown–Moon–Zoloth decomposition 
The gender mean wage differential ( )
M F ww −  (superscripts M and F refer to men and women, 
respectively) can be decomposed according to hierarchical job levels (denoted by the subscript k; 
k=1,...,K): 
(1)       ()
M FM M F F
kk k k
k
ww p wp w −= − ∑   
where 
G
k p , G=M,F, represents the sample proportion of gender G in job level k. 
For each of the K job levels, separately for men and women, we regress the (log) wage on 
the observed characteristics of the workers and firms (denoted by the vector
G
k x ). The average wage 
is rewritten as  ˆ '
GG G
kk k wx β = , so that: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ '' ' ' '
M F M MM F FF M FMM FMM FF
kk k k k k k k k k k k k k k
kk k
ww p x p x pp x p x x
JLE WDE
β ββ β β −= − = − + − ∑∑ ∑
 
The term JLE captures the impact of different distributions of men and women across job levels, 
whereas WDE gives the combined intra-job-level wage differential effect. Both effects can be 
further decomposed into an explained and unexplained part. WDE becomes: 
(3)         ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ''
F FM F F MMF
kk k k k k k k
kk
WDE p x p x x ββ β =− +− ∑∑  
where the first term represents the unexplained parts of the intra-job-level wage differential, and the 
second term is based on differences in observed characteristics x (the endowment effect) across job 
levels. 
Similarly, JLE can be decomposed as: 
(4)        ( ) ( ) ˆˆ
M FF M MF
kk k kk k
kk
JLE w p p w p p =− +− ∑∑  
ˆ
F
k p  gives the predicted job-level attainment using the observable characteristics of the female 
workers. The estimated parameters underlying  ˆ
F
k p  are based on an ordered probit model for a 
selected sample of men. Thus, the estimated parameters for males are combined with women’s 
characteristics to obtain the predicted job-level attainment for women. 
The first term of equation (4) refers to unjustifiable gender differences in job-level attainment 
(vertical segregation); the second term refers to differences in observed characteristics x (the 
endowment effect). If 
M F
kk p p = , k=1,…,K, the JLE-effect is nil. If, in addition, the parameter 
estimates of the wage equation do not vary across the K job levels, 
M M
k β β = , 
F F
k β β = , WDE 
returns the original Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.   15
Table A1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable    Definition           Men     Women   
                mean std.  err.   mean std.  err. 
small part-time  hours worked per week<20    dummy variable  0.03  0.16    0.25  0.43 
part-time   20≤hours worked per week<36    dummy variable  0.02  0.14    0.25  0.43 
full-time    hours worked per week≥36    dummy  variable  0.95 0.21    0.51 0.50 
foreign    foreign worker (non-Dutch)    dummy variable  0.04  0.21    0.05  0.21 
age   worker's  age          40.09  10.35  37.30  10.31 
tenure    years with current employer        10.96  9.43    7.61  6.84 
primary    Basic education (LO)      dummy variable  0.05  0.22    0.07  0.25 
low general  first-level general education (MAVO)  dummy variable  0.07  0.26    0.19  0.39 
low vocational  first-level vocational education (MBO)  dummy variable  0.39  0.49    0.22  0.41 
secondary general  secondary school diploma (HAVO, VWO)  dummy variable  0.06  0.24    0.14  0.35 
secondary vocational  advanced vocational education (HABO)  dummy variable  0.23  0.42    0.25  0.43 
university    university  (WO)      dummy  variable  0.15 0.36    0.10 0.31 
technical    technical occupation  dummy variable  0.44  0.50    0.11  0.31 
Administrative  administrative occupation  dummy variable  0.10  0.30    0.31  0.46 
information technology  IT occupation     dummy variable  0.03  0.17    0.01  0.10 
Commercial  commercial  occupation    dummy  variable  0.08 0.27    0.12 0.32 
services    service occupation  dummy variable  0.21  0.41    0.41  0.49 
Management  Management    dummy  variable  0.12 0.33    0.04 0.19 
creative    creative occupation  dummy variable  0.02  0.15    0.02  0.13 
very simple tasks  Level I     dummy variable  0.01  0.11    0.05  0.22 
simple and repetitive tasks  Level II    dummy variable  0.07  0.25    0.12  0.33 
routines with simple decision making  Level III    dummy variable  0.17  0.38    0.25  0.43 
non routine, with simple decision making Level IV    dummy variable  0.25  0.43    0.20  0.40 
difficult tasks, decision making  Level V     dummy variable  0.28  0.45    0.27  0.44 
difficult tasks, initiative  Level VI     dummy variable  0.17  0.38    0.09  0.28 
Management  Level VII     dummy variable  0.05  0.21    0.02  0.14 
1 - 4    fewer than 5 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.02  0.13    0.02  0.15 
5 - 9    5 - 9 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.03  0.17    0.05  0.22 
10 - 19    10 - 19 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.08  0.28    0.08  0.28 
20 – 49    20 - 49 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.14  0.34    0.11  0.32   16
Table A1: Continued. 
50 – 99    50 - 99 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.15  0.36    0.14  0.35 
100 - 199    100 - 199 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.20  0.40    0.17  0.37 
200 - 499    200 - 499 employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.18  0.38    0.19  0.39 
=> 500    500 or more employees at the firm    dummy variable  0.20  0.40    0.23  0.42 
Agriculture  ISIC (Rev. 3) 01 – 05      dummy variable  0.01  0.12    0.01  0.09 
mining    ISIC (Rev. 3) 10 – 14      dummy variable  0.01  0.10    0.00  0.07 
Manufacturing  ISIC (Rev. 3) 15 – 37      dummy variable  0.34  0.47    0.18  0.38 
public utilities  ISIC (Rev. 3) 40 – 41      dummy  variable  0.03  0.16  0.01  0.10 
Construction  ISIC (Rev. 3) 45      dummy variable  0.09  0.29    0.01  0.10 
wholesale & retail trade  ISIC (Rev. 3) 50 – 52      dummy variable  0.14  0.35    0.15  0.36 
restaurants & hotels  ISIC (Rev. 3) 55      dummy variable  0.01  0.10    0.02  0.15 
transport & communication  ISIC (Rev. 3) 60 – 64      dummy variable  0.09  0.28    0.05  0.22 
financial services  ISIC (Rev. 3) 65 – 67      dummy variable  0.03  0.17    0.05  0.22 
business services  ISIC (Rev. 3) 70 – 74      dummy variable  0.11  0.31    0.13  0.33 
public administration  ISIC (Rev. 3) 75      dummy variable  0.07  0.25    0.07  0.25 
education    ISIC (Rev. 3) 80      dummy variable  0.01  0.09    0.01  0.10 
health services  ISIC (Rev. 3) 85      dummy variable  0.03  0.17    0.24  0.42 
culture, sport, & other personal services ISIC (Rev. 3) 90 – 99      dummy variable  0.03  0.18    0.07  0.26 
industry level collective agreement  industry level collective agreement (bargaining)  dummy variable  0.72  0.45    0.73  0.45 
firm level collective agreement  Firm level collective agreement (bargaining)  dummy variable  0.07  0.25    0.04  0.20 
AVV    AVV        dummy  variable  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.17 
non union   Not covered by any union agreement  dummy variable  0.00  0.04    0.00  0.06 
length of the working week  usual number of hours per week at the firm, in log     38.61  1.67    37.80  1.73 
hourly base wage  gross base wage (without overtime or bonuses) divided    3.30  0.38    3.12  0.33 
    by the number of hours worked (in log)      3.37  0.39    3.16  0.34 
hourly full wage  wage including individual pay components per hour worked (in log)           
overtime    overtime compensation received    dummy variable  0.24  0.43    0.09  0.29 
number  of  observations              52,402    25,305  
   17
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Table 1: The hierarchy of jobs: their number, the incidence of women and the wage distributions. 
 Whole  Sample  Full-time 
Job  average  percentiles  % workers level  number  proportion  average percentiles  % workers level number  proportion
Level wage 10 90 wage  <  (w
90)k-1  of jobs  of women  wage  wage < (w
90)k-1  90  wage < (w
90)k-1  of jobs of women
I 2.700  2.092  3.001  -  2,031 63.71  2.765 2.489  3.001 -  587 34.24 
II 2.762  2.209  3.100  0.787  7,527 45.66  2.833 2.465  3.109 0.755  3,990 24.18 
III 2.954  2.682  3.218  0.716  15,943 40.12  2.975 2.727  3.218 0.726 10,936 23.55 
IV 3.114  2.880  3.332  0.716  17,769 27.64  3.117 2.900  3.326 0.724  14,111 15.12 
V 3.300  3.030  3.576  0.560  20,644 31.80  3.306 3.038  3.577 0.536 16,514 19.53 
VI 3.638  3.305  3.967  0.399  10,907 20.02  3.649 3.321  3.977 0.384  9,493 13.31 
VII 3.971  3.601  4.351  0.503  2,886 17.32  3.986  3.618  4.363 0.490  2,584 11.46 
Number of 
cases  77,707              58,215              
 
Table 2: Raw gender wage gap at selected centiles of the overall wage distribution 
    
Full 
Sample        Full-Time    
percentile Men  Women  gap  Men  Women  gap 
10  2.840 2.712 0.128 2.885  2.755  0.130 
25  3.027 2.871 0.156 3.049  2.896  0.153 
50  3.211 3.073 0.138 3.222  3.088  0.134 
75  3.468 3.280 0.188 3.480  3.308  0.172 
90  3.765 3.483 0.282 3.778  3.534  0.244 
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Table 4: Raw gender wage gap at selected centiles of the wage distribution by job level  
Full Sample             
     I        II        III        IV    
percentile  Men  Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap 
10  1.890  2.303 -0.413 2.218 2.198 0.020 2.699 2.660 0.039 2.919 2.823 0.096 
25  2.470  2.712 -0.242 2.687 2.679 0.008 2.875 2.812 0.063 3.033 2.947 0.086 
50  2.762  2.804 -0.042 2.875 2.829 0.046 3.014 2.947 0.067 3.135 3.098 0.037 
75  2.896  2.913 -0.017 3.006 2.940 0.066 3.135 3.088 0.047 3.241 3.219 0.022 
90  2.995  3.007 -0.012 3.127 3.051 0.076 3.238 3.201 0.037 3.343 3.306 0.037 
               
     V        VI        VII        
percentile  Men  Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap       
10  3.068  2.975 0.093 3.355 3.195 0.160 3.667 3.390 0.277       
25  3.193  3.111 0.082 3.511 3.346 0.165 3.827 3.609 0.218       
50  3.323  3.256 0.067 3.666 3.522 0.144 4.000 3.797 0.203       
75  3.465  3.381 0.084 3.829 3.677 0.152 4.187 3.986 0.201       
90  3.597  3.502 0.095 3.992 3.832 0.160 4.383 4.138 0.245       
                                      
Full-time Workers               
     I        II        III        IV    
percentile  Men  Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap 
10  2.487  2.515 -0.028 2.465 2.470 -0.006 2.753 2.669 0.084 2.928 2.798 0.131 
25  2.713  2.700 0.013 2.766 2.716 0.049 2.896 2.804 0.092 3.039 2.916 0.124 
50  2.849  2.821 0.027 2.912 2.832 0.080 3.022 2.923 0.099 3.135 3.054 0.082 
75  2.939  2.887 0.052 3.022 2.923 0.099 3.135 3.050 0.085 3.237 3.178 0.059 
90  3.033  2.964 0.069 3.127 3.023 0.105 3.236 3.161 0.075 3.334 3.283 0.052 
               
     V        VI        VII          
percentile  Men  Women gap  Men Women gap  Men Women gap       
10  3.070  2.946 0.124 3.362 3.164 0.198 3.669 3.342 0.328       
25  3.193  3.088 0.106 3.513 3.332 0.181 3.832 3.563 0.269       
50  3.323  3.243 0.080 3.669 3.507 0.162 4.003 3.789 0.214       
75  3.464  3.377 0.087 3.831 3.677 0.154 4.190 3.990 0.200       
90  3.593  3.503 0.090 3.995 3.835 0.160 4.384 4.151 0.233         20
 
 
Table 3: Brown – Moon – Zoloth decomposition, full sample 
a) 
wage differential (WDE)  vertical segregation (JLE) 
explained unexplained explained  Unexplained 
0.017 0.044 0.078  0.040 
a) The controls of the wage regressions (dependent variable: log hourly wage) and the ordered 
probit model (dependent variable job level) are: working hours (2 part-time dummies), foreign born, 
age, age squared, years of tenure, tenure squared, educational level (6 dummies), previous labor 
market position (5 dummies), dummy for worked overtime, firm size (7 dummies) occupation (7 
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Table 5: The raw gender (log) wage gap and its unexplained part across the deciles of the 
wage distribution by job level 
a) 
 Job  Level   
Deciles I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII   
1 0.364  -0.022  -0.052  -0.089 -0.088 -0.155 -0.245   
 (0.043)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.006)(0.006)(0.009)(0.028)   
2 0.314  -0.019  -0.063  -0.081 -0.083 -0.155 -0.232   
 (0.037)  (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.004)(0.004)(0.007)(0.021)   
3 0.210  -0.031  -0.067  -0.069 -0.078 -0.154 -0.217   
 (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.004)(0.003)(0.007)(0.019)   
4 0.130  -0.039  -0.066  -0.057 -0.076 -0.152 -0.209   
 (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.004)(0.003)(0.007)(0.017)   
5 0.077  -0.048  -0.063  -0.046 -0.075 -0.150 -0.207   
 (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.003)(0.003)(0.006)(0.017)   
6 0.042  -0.056  -0.057  -0.036 -0.076 -0.150 -0.202   
 (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004)(0.003)(0.006)(0.017)   
7 0.013  -0.062  -0.050  -0.028 -0.078 -0.150 -0.203   
 (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)(0.003)(0.007)(0.016)   
8 -0.008  -0.066  -0.042  -0.024 -0.082 -0.150 -0.218   
 (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)(0.004)(0.008)(0.016)   
9 -0.026  -0.066  -0.035  -0.026 -0.087 -0.156 -0.234   
 (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.004)(0.005)(0.010)(0.020)   
             
Unexplained part of the raw gender (log) wage gap     
 Job  Level   
Deciles I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII   
1 0.078  0.012  0.010  -0.019 -0.022 -0.035 -0.073   
 (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.008)(0.008)(0.011)(0.022)   
2 0.083  0.018  0.001  -0.026 -0.029 -0.049 -0.080   
 (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.006)(0.006)(0.009)(0.019)   
3 0.071  0.022  -0.006  -0.027 -0.035 -0.057 -0.078   
 (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.006)(0.005)(0.008)(0.018)   
4 0.054  0.023  -0.011  -0.025 -0.040 -0.063 -0.082   
 (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.006)(0.005)(0.007)(0.018)   
5 0.035  0.016  -0.014  -0.023 -0.045 -0.066 -0.091   
 (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.006)(0.005)(0.008)(0.017)   
6 0.017  0.008  -0.015  -0.022 -0.050 -0.071 -0.094   
 (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)(0.005)(0.008)(0.017)   
7 -0.0004  -0.001  -0.016  -0.023 -0.057 -0.077 -0.105   
 (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)(0.005)(0.008)(0.017)   
8 -0.016  -0.012  -0.016  -0.028 -0.066 -0.080 -0.128   
 (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)(0.006)(0.009)(0.020)   
9 -0.041  -0.023  -0.019  -0.046 -0.080 -0.083 -0.151   
 (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.008)(0.008)(0.011)(0.022)   
a) Each of the seven regressions included the following controls: see Table 3.   22
Table 6: Unconditional and conditional representation of women below the first, and above 
the ninth decile of the male (log) wage distribution, by job level. Bootstrap standard 
error in parenthesis (100 replications).
a)  
Full Sample          
  Overall  Job Level I  Job Level II  Job Level III 
  below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.210 0.027 0.036 0.111 0.106 0.047 0.124 0.067 
    (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
conditional 0.111 0.068 0.110 0.159 0.102 0.097 0.104 0.074 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.043) (0.039) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) 
          
  Job Level IV  Job Level V  Job Level VI  Job Level VII 
  below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.207 0.067 0.196 0.045 0.255 0.032 0.324 0.024 
    (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
conditional 0.125 0.044 0.153 0.055 0.163 0.063 0.182 0.074 
    (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.029) (0.017) 
          
Full-Time          
  Overall  Job Level I  Job Level II  Job Level III 
  below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.238 0.025 0.035 0.037 0.099 0.032  0.17  0.048 
    (0.005) (0.002) (0.028) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) 
conditional  0.16  0.049 0.164 0.124 0.145 0.065  0.16  0.061 
    (0.005) (0.003) (0.039) (0.045) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
          
  Job Level IV  Job Level V  Job Level VI  Job Level VII 
  below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.275 0.052 0.228 0.041 0.298 0.036  0.38  0.024 
    (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) 
conditional  0.18  0.045 0.175 0.057 0.178 0.048 0.223 0.062 
    (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.033) (0.014) 
a) For control variables of all regressions: See Table 3. 
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Table 7: Unconditional and conditional severity of the representation of women below the 
first and above the ninth deciles of the male (log) wage distribution, by job level. 
Bootstrap standard error in parenthesis (100 replications).
 a) 
Full  Sample          
  Overall  Job Level I  Job Level II  Job Level III 
  below 10 above 90  below 10  above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.255 0.020  0.040  0.170 0.123 0.051 0.131 0.061 
    (0.006) (0.001)  (0.039)  (0.045) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
conditional 0.109 0.068  0.122  0.138 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.083 
    (0.005) (0.003)  (0.039)  (0.045) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
            
  Job Level IV  Job Level V  Job Level VI  Job Level VII 
  below 10 above 90  below 10  above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.184 0.058  0.224  0.035 0.329 0.023 0.443 0.018 
    (0.010) (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.034) (0.006) 
conditional 0.123 0.041  0.158  0.041 0.187 0.053 0.228 0.054 
    (0.013) (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.033) (0.014) 
            
Full-Time           
  Overall  Job Level I  Job Level II  Job Level III 
  below 10 above 90  below 10  above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.279 0.025  0.110  0.037 0.131 0.028 0.195 0.036 
    (0.007) (0.025)  (0.053)  (0.059) (0.017) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) 
conditional 0.182 0.041  0.157  0.111 0.177 0.075 0.176 0.051 
    (0.007) (0.002)  (0.053)  (0.059) (0.024) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) 
            
  Job Level IV  Job Level V  Job Level VI  Job Level VII 
  below 10 above 90  below 10  above 90 below 10 above 90 below 10 above 90
unconditional  0.294 0.038  0.274  0.03  0.365 0.026 0.492 0.016 
    (0.015) (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.039) (0.007) 
conditional 0.191 0.037  0.19  0.044 0.231 0.037 0.309 0.036 
    (0.016) (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.004) (0.018) (0.006) (0.037) (0.010) 
 a) For control variables of all regressions: See Table 3 
 
 